bill(s)," would result in substantial outlays of taxpayer money to financial institutions deemed systemically significant, or "too big to fail." 5 In March 2009, the American public became aware that "bailed out" institutions would be making large bonus payments to their executives and employees. A groundswell of populist outrage erupted. 6 Indignation over compensation became so emphatic that employees of bailed-out institutions received death threats, and bailed-out corporations were forced to hire armed guards to protect their office buildings. 7 One group of outraged citizens organized a bus tour stopping at AIG executives' homes to ensure AIG executives would hear their protests. 8 Politicians were quick to jump on the populist bandwagon. Any politician worth her mettle must possess the ability to recognize which way the winds of popular sentiment are blowing and adjust accordingly. Their professional duty is to represent their constituencies. Because their constituents were outraged over the bonus payments, the politicians' response was only natural. Members of Congress publicly lambasted bonus compensation payments. 9 President Obama insisted that such compensation should not be tolerated. 10 The House of Representatives swiftly passed H.R. 1542, a bill that proposed a 90% tax on bonus compensation made by bailout recipients.
11
Despite their reactionary criticisms, members of Congress had recognized the potential for abusive bonus in the bailout legislation's gestation period. Some members voiced their desire for strict compensation limitations for corporations receiving federal funds; however, they faced opposition for their 2009 14. Stout, supra note 1.
stance on executive compensation. 12 President George W. Bush's Administration, in particular Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson, opposed stringent regulation of executive wages. 13 Secretary Paulson argued that if significant limitations on executive pay were tied to federal aid, firms would refuse to participate in aid program, thereby damaging the efficacy of the stabilization plan.
14 Because of the political wrangling during the passage of EESA, little progress was made in the battle to curb excessive executive compensation. Nevertheless, proponents of regulating executive compensation were able to make significant changes to how corporations compensated their executives with the ARRA. The purpose of this Note is to explore the political negotiations surrounding the passage of the EESA and ARRA, with the aim of addressing whether opponents of executive compensation regulation had a legitimate claim during the negotiations surrounding the EESA. Specifically, could a corporate board of directors refuse federal aid because of the limitations placed on executive pay? A second purpose of the Note is to examine the legislative decision to address excessiveness in executive compensation and the need to stabilize the economy in the same bill. This Note argues that by packaging its solutions to these two distinct problems together, Congress hindered its ability to resolve each problem effectively. In Part I of this Note, I will survey the political and economic landscape surrounding the passage of EESA and ARRA. In Part II, I will discuss the limitations placed on executive pay by the EESA and the subsequent amendments in ARRA. Part III discusses potential ramifications of a board of directors' decision to reject federal aid because of the limitations placed on executive pay. Part IV concludes the Note with a discussion of congressional effectiveness. [ The subprime mortgage crisis loomed over the global economy during the summer of 2008.
18 Pundits, politicians and journalists could see the precipice approach, but no one could predict the calamitous results of the eventual meltdown. On September 16, following its decision to takeover mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the Treasury Department and Federal Reserve announced the rescue of one of the world's largest insurers, American International Group (AIG). 19 Meanwhile, the same agencies allowed the venerable investment bank Lehman Brothers to fail.
20
The following day the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) closed 450 points lower than its previous close. 21 In the subsequent three weeks, the DJIA would take a precipitous fall, flying past the 10,000 point mark, finally meeting some resistance at 8, 451 high reached a year before on October 12, 2007, almost one year to the date.
22
The S&P 500 lost nearly a quarter of its total value during the same three weeks. 23 Every world market felt similar declines, including a twenty-plus percent drop in the Russian RTS, prompting the index to suspend trading indefinitely. 24 Market shocks of this magnitude had not occurred or manifested since the Great Depression. Accumulated wealth simply vanished. Americans were lucky if their retirement funds, typically heavy on securities, retained half of their pre-shock values. 25 Irresponsible borrowing and lending, coupled with the securitization of risk, created an environment of great uncertainty. When the market for toxic subprime debt disappeared, banks that had securitized the debt and held it as assets on their balance sheets were forced to take colossal write-offs.
26
While the markets plummeted, uncertainty surged. Credit markets began to freeze as banks unsure about the strength of their holdings and crippled by write-offs became reluctant to loan what little capital they had left. 27 The credit freeze allowed problems for the banks to ripple throughout the economy. 28 Before the shock, a constant flow of credit allowed corporations to rely on short-term debt for working capital. 29 Once lending started to dry up, corporations that had become dependent on commercial paper markets struggled to secure the money necessary to make payroll and cover overhead. 30 Concurrently, consumers stopped spending. 31 Lacking customers for revenue or the ability to obtain credit, businesses were forced to lay off hundreds of thousands of workers. 32 To address the crisis, the Bush Administration planned to increase capital in the banking system. 37 The Administration had faith that by providing banks with capital, banks would be more likely to make loans, which in turn would unfreeze the credit markets and return the economy to normalcy.
38
The plan targeted nine of the nation's largest financial institutions for the first injections of capital. These nine institutions held 55 percent of the United State's banking assets and were considered "systemically significant to the operation of the financial system." 39 only healthy, viable, institutions would be eligible for funding. 40 Because the Administration considered the institutions healthy, their participation in the program would be voluntary. 41 In the weeks that would follow, the House and Senate fattened the Paulson/Bernanke plan into acceptable legislation. The process was arduous. At times it appeared as though negotiations might unravel creating catastrophic government action unseen since Hurricane Katrina. As concern over that possibility mounted, President Bush was forced to step in; he called a press conference to assure the American people failure to act would not be tolerated. 42 Congress ultimately capitulated bringing the Administration's bank capitalization program to life with the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA).
43

Executive Compensation Throws a Wrench in the Works
Executive compensation became a major sticking point. Criticism of executive compensation packages has been pervasive in the American political and corporate landscapes for the better part of the past two decades. As the United States economy turned the corner on the stagflation of the 1970s, corporations realized greater profits. Significant increases in the overall compensation for executives accompanied these corporate gains. In 1978 the average chief executive officer (CEO)'s compensation was thirty-five times more than that of the average worker. By 2005 that ratio swelled to 262 times the size of the average worker's pay. 44 Between 1991 and 2001, CEO compensation grew by a rate of nearly 340%, 45 while growth in employee wages was relatively stagnant over the same period. Support for limiting compensation came from both sides of the aisle. Representative Barney Frank, Democrat and ranking member of the House Financial Services Committee, put forth a proposal which would give the Treasury the authority to set "appropriate standards" for executive compensation for firms receiving bailout funding. 52 The proposal also included a provision giving corporations the authority to "claw-back" compensation payments already made. 53 Republican presidential candidate Senator John McCain called for a strict cap on executive compensation at a level of $400,000, the same wage paid to the President of the United States. Fearful that the bailout would save Wall Street and not Main Street, Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama summed up the sentiment of many Americans when he stated, "Taxpayers shouldn't be spending a dime to reward CEOs on Wall Street while they're going out the door."
55 Instead of having their taxes spent on economic recovery and increasing liquidity, Americans feared corporations would use bailout funds to compensate the same executives and managers they considered responsible for the crisis. 57 Despite regulations on executive pay, top executives' compensation at these firms receiving bailout funds collectively totaled $1.6 billion.
58
The American public responded to the bailout with mixed opinions, ranging from great antipathy to complete skepticism. Protestors marched in many major American cities. 59 One poll noted only 28% of Americans supported the bailout. 60 Congress recognized the need for more legislation. Following the election of Barack Obama, Congress immediately got to work on the second piece of bailout legislation, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (AARA).
61
On February 4, while the ARRA was making its way through the Senate, President Obama released his proposal for executive compensation missed a huge opportunity to set a strict and measurable limit on executive pay. I'm afraid companies will find ways to shift compensation to other pots and continue to make massive payouts that have so outraged the American people.").
regulation.
62 President Obama broadcasted his concerns, "For top executives to award themselves these kinds of compensation packages in the midst of this economic crisis is not only in bad taste-it's a bad strategy-and I will not tolerate it."
63 The President's plan proposed capping executive compensation at $500,000.
64 Additionally, incentive-based bonus payments would be confined to grants of stock options, redeemable only after all corporate obligations to the government were repaid.
65
The week after President Obama released his proposal for executive compensation, the House Financial Services Committee, poised to get tough on executive compensation, called on the heads of the nine "systemically significant" financial institutions to testify about the first round of the bailout. 66 Citing public anger over the perceived failures of the bailout, Committee members preceded to brow beat these CEOs for, among other things, extraordinary salaries, lavishly refurbishing already exquisite offices, and ownership of vacation homes. 67 One CEO, Vikram Pandit of Citigroup, pledged to cut his own salary to one dollar until Citigroup returned to profitability.
68
Although Congress dropped President Obama's request for a strict cap on compensation from the final bill, the ARRA made substantial amendments to the executive compensation regulations of EESA. 69 Because the reforms on executive pay apply to any business with an outstanding obligation arising from participation in TARP, institutions which voluntarily agreed 72 It provides limitations on pay deemed excessive, prohibits incentives that encourage unnecessary risk taking, and forbids golden parachute payouts to executives of financial institutions that receive bailout funds. 73 In spite of the bellicose public discourse about the need to control executive compensation, the final provisions of the bill failed to rein in the perceived excesses of executive compensation.
First, limitations on executive pay apply only to firms who received TARP assistance. 74 The Secretary of the Treasury uses TARP funds to promote market stability by purchasing troubled assets, such as mortgage backed securities, in exchange for non-voting preferred stock and warrants for common stock from participating corporations. 75 These sales create corporate obligations to the United States government, and corporations are subject to the limitations so long as the obligations are outstanding. As of March 10, 2009, almost 400 institutions have participated in the program by selling assets to the U.S. government. 
Limitations That Satisfy "Appropriate Standards"
In order to receive assistance, corporations participating in TARP must sign an agreement stating they will obey the limitations on executive pay promulgated by section 111 and the Treasury Department. 77 In section 111, Congress delegated the burden to set limitations, or "appropriate standards" for executives ' compensation, 78 to the Treasury Department. The assignment was not entirely lacking direction; Congress mandated that the Treasury's standards satisfy certain criteria.
The limitations must exclude forms of incentive-based compensation that encourage senior executive officers (SEOs) to take unnecessary risk.
79 A "senior executive officer" is defined as any of the top five "highly paid executives" whose compensation must be reported to the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
80
"Unnecessary risk" is not defined.
Compensation Committees
Under the regulations the Treasury Department promulgated, corporate boards must appoint independent compensation committees in order to prevent compensation that encourages unnecessary risk. 81 These committees must review the contracts of SEOs with company risk officers to ensure that "SEO incentive compensation arrangements do not encourage SEOs to take unnecessary and excessive risks that threaten the value of the TARP recipient." 82 In order to comply, the committee should identify any short-term or long-term risks the contracts may encourage, and then proceed to limit compensation so that SEOs are not "encouraged to take [such] risks."
83 Also, the committee must certify to the Treasury that the committee complied with all review requirements, and "must provide an explanation of how their senior executive compensation arrangements do not encourage excessive and Although these regulations on their face appear to place heavy burdens on participating institutions, in practice, institutions would likely have to make few changes. First, in order to receive the deduction for performance-based pay allowed under section 162 of the Tax Code, corporations must already have independent compensation committees established to certify that performance goals have been met and a majority of shareholders voted to approve the terms and payment of the performance-based remuneration. 86 Moreover, any company that is publicly traded on the NASDAQ or the NYSE must have an independent compensation committee review executive compensation. 87 All of the nine "systemically significant" financial institutions are publicly traded on either the NASDAQ or the NYSE. 
Claw-backs
The "appropriate standards" must also include a provision that allows for the claw-back of any bonus compensation payments made to SEOs based on financial reports later found to be inaccurate. 89 This provision is similar to Sarbanes-Oxley Act section 304, which provides for the disgorgement of bonus payments or profits made on securities sales of CEOs and CFOs. 90 However, unlike section 304, there is not a limited recovery period. The provision applies to inaccuracies in both accounting and performance metrics, and claw-back is required whenever a material inaccuracy is found. packages; it merely provides a means for corporations to recover compensation payments that should not have been made.
Golden Parachutes
The final Treasury limitation is a provision prohibiting the payment of golden parachute payments. 92 Golden parachute payments are large payments made in connection with the termination of an executive's employment. 93 These types of payments were a major talking point in the discourse surrounding the bailout negotiations. 94 Although, on its face, the provision prevents employers from making golden parachute payments, the section (d) sunset provision provides a large loophole which renders the parachute prohibition ineffectual.
95 Section (d) permits payments on golden parachute clauses that were contracted for prior to the corporate receipt of TARP funds. 96 A corporation need only to negotiate any golden parachute clauses before participating in TARP to work around the parachute proscription of section (b)(2)(C).
In addition to the regulations of section 111, section 302 amends the limitation on salary deductions permitted under section 162 of the Tax Code.
97
Under the amended version, firms participating in TARP are limited to a $500,000 rather than a $1 million deduction for executive salaries.
98
As noted earlier, these provisions were ultimately ineffective in curbing excessive compensation. Wall Street bonuses for 2008 exceeded $18 billion; and firms receiving TARP funds paid out $1.6 billion in compensation. 
Round Two: The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
The ARRA provisions targeted at reining in excessive executive pay are located in Title VII, "Limits on Executive Compensation." 100 Working within the framework of the first bailout bill, Congress made significant amendments to the controls on executive pay. With some of the amendments, Congress took matters into its own hands by enacting express restrictions on pay. Although these restrictions are meaningful, of more consequence is Congress's decision to grant the Executive its own authority to limit executive compensation.
Amending Section 111
In the ARRA, Congress opted to amend the "appropriate standards" of the EESA's section 111. The amendments are applicable to any company, public or private, that has received or seeks to receive funds from the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) established by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008.
101 Similar to original section 111, section (b)(3)(B) provides for recovery of any bonus or incentive payments made on the basis of financial statements found to be materially inaccurate. 102 However, the scope of this provision was expanded so that it applies to any "senior executive officer and any of the next 20 most highly compensated employees" in firms that received TARP funding.
103
Section (b)(3)(C) addresses the aforementioned weakness of the golden parachute sunset provision in section (d) of EESA. Under the modified provision, firms who receive TARP aid may not make golden parachute payments to senior executives, and the next five most highly compensated employees while any obligations arising from TARP assistance remain outstanding.
104
The ARRA retains TARP recipients' obligation to establish "Independent Compensation Committees." 105 In each fiscal year, TARP recipients must provide the Treasury with a narrative describing how each affected employee's compensation complies with the compensation limitations and the changes made to their compensation packages.
106 Also, section (e) requires annual shareholder voting on executive compensation plans, commonly known as a "say on pay vote"; however, this vote is non-binding on the Board of Directors.
107
Congress responded to reports of TARP recipient's expenditures on luxury executive bathroom renovations and plans to purchase corporate jets by adding section (d).
108 Section (d) places limitations on corporate policies and expenditures in regards to luxury expenditures. 109 Luxury expenditures are those expenses the Treasury Secretary deems excessive or a luxury.
110 These may include, but are not limited to, expenses for entertainment, office renovations, and aviation or other transportation.
111 Corporate boards must adopt and publish an "excessive or luxury policy" to comply with these requirements. 112 
Limitations on Incentive-Based Compensation
The most aggressive limitations established by Congress are found in (b)(3)(D). This section prohibits TARP recipients from paying or accruing bonus or incentive-based payments while TARP obligations remain outstanding. 113 In addition, disbursements of stock as compensation are limited to long-term options that cannot vest until the firms repay all obligations arising from TARP assistance. 114 The value of these options cannot exceed one-third of total annual compensation. 115 These provisions can apply to employees and are not necessarily limited to SEO's. The applicability of compensation limitations the provision imposes is dependent on the amount of funding received. For firms who receive less than $25,000,000 in TARP assistance, bonus limitations apply only to the most highly-compensated employee. 117 For firms receiving between $25,000,000 and $250,000,000, compensation limitations apply to the five most highly-compensated employees. 118 For firms receiving between $250,000,000 and $500,000,000, limitations shall apply to senior executive officers and the ten next most highly-compensated employees. 119 Finally, for firms receiving over $500,000,000, limitations shall apply to senior executive officers and the twenty next most highly-compensated employees. 120 This final section of limitations would apply to every major bank that received TARP assistance in late 2008, including: Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase, Wells Fargo, Bank of America, Morgan Stanley, and Goldman Sachs.
121 It would also include major auto makers General Motors and Chrysler. 122 In all cases, the Secretary of the Treasury may elect to impose these conditions on a broader range of employees if the Secretary determines it serves the interest of the public. and other compensation paid to senior executive officers and the next twenty most highly-compensated employees of each entity receiving TARP assistance" prior to the enactment of ARRA. 126 Should the Secretary deem any such payments contrary to public interest or inconsistent with the premise of TARP, he must negotiate with the TARP recipient and employee for reimbursement of the compensation or bonus to the Federal Government. 128 Should he determine the payments were contrary to the policy of section 111 of the ARRA, Mr. Feinberg must negotiate with the TARP recipient and employee for reimbursement of the payment to the U.S. Government.
129
Mr. Feinberg also has the duty to review and approve the compensation plans for SEOs and the 100 most highly compensated employees at all corporations receiving "exceptional assistance" or $500,000,000 in assistance. 130 He has the authority to disapprove compensation arrangements that he deems excessive, inappropriate, or unsound. 131 Corporations are obligated to produce all documentation the Special Master requires to complete the compensation plan reviews.
132
The Pay Czar, backed by the executive, appears committed to reining in excessive executive compensation. Mr. Feinberg has asserted his authority and intention to review and revise previous bonus payouts and current compensation packages of all TARP recipients despite the limiting statutory provision and the Treasury Department's earlier claim that compensation limitations will not apply to agreements entered into prior to 138. If you restrict compensation payments on the 20 most highly-compensated employees, presumably that group will no longer be the 20 most highly-compensated employees because the next 20 most highly compensated employees will take their place. If in turn their compensation payments are capped, the regulations will effectively set a cap on payments at the same level of the original 20 most highly-compensated employees. 
Overall Effect on TARP Recipient Corporations
Some critics of the amendments argue the provisions fall short of effectively reining in the excesses of corporate compensation. 135 One potential loophole would be for compensation committees to simply raise base salaries of corporate executives. Although the amended section 111 places strict limitations on bonus payments, it does not place caps on all forms of compensation. Despite President Obama's plan to cap all compensation at $500,000, the ARRA in no way restricts or limits salary payments. Typically, corporations take advantage of section 162(m) of the Tax Code, which allows corporations to deduct payments to employees, by paying executives salaries under $1,000,000; the vast majority of compensation comes in the form of incentive-based pay. However EESA amended section 162(m), limiting salary expenditures for TARP recipients to $500,000. 136 Compensation committees could choose to forgo tax benefits. By increasing an executive's fixed salary, corporations could maintain the value of corporate compensation packages. If a committee decided to evade compensation limitations, it would result in greater tax revenue for the federal government.
Nevertheless, the limitations on executive pay implemented in the ARRA are drastically different from those of the EESA. Unlike EESA regulations, the limitations imposed by the ARRA will significantly change how TARP participants compensate their employees. 137 One of the most dramatic shifts are the potential limitations of (b)(3)(D). Depending on the regulations the Treasury adopts, these limitations have the potential for capping compensation on all employees. 138 Most importantly, the Pay Czar may force TARP participants to recoup bonus payments and change their current compensation packages.
PART III-CORPORATE DUTY TO PARTICIPATE IN TARP
The chief executives of the nine largest banks in the United States trooped into a gilded conference room at the Treasury Department at 3 p.m. Monday. To their astonishment, they were each handed a one-page document that said they agreed to sell shares to the government, then Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr. said they must sign it before they left.
"It was a take it or take it offer," said one person who was briefed on the meeting, speaking on condition of anonymity because the discussions were private. "Everyone knew there was only one answer."-The New York Times
139
After over three hours of deliberation, all nine institutions capitulated to Secretary Paulson's demand to participate in TARP. The choice to acquiesce did not come easy for every CEO. The decision to participate in TARP puts corporate directors and executives in a unique position. As noted, the aid comes with many strings attached, including: increased compliance costs, forcing corporations to make substantial adjustments in their business plans and corporate structure, and subjects Board of Director decisions to oversight by the Treasury Secretary and Pay Czar that carry the potential for corporate and federal claw-back of misused corporate funds. The ARRA provisions are also potentially damaging to shareholders, because corporations must issue preferred shares and warrants for common stock in exchange for TARP aid, thereby diluting each shareholder's ownership. Most importantly to the discussion at hand, a vote to obtain TARP assistance by a director is in effect a vote to lower their own pay.
As Secretary Paulson predicted during the negotiations of EESA, restrictions on executive compensation endangered the participation of financial institutions. 140 During the meeting, Richard Kovacevich, CEO of Wells Fargo, fought against Paulson's proposal by raising concerns over the restrictions on executive compensation. 141 At the time, Mr. Kovacevich's severance entitlements totaled nearly $200,000,000.
142 Kenneth Lewis, CEO of Bank of America, responded to concerns over the restrictions by urging
